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Abstract:  Two recent strands of research have contributed to our understanding of the 
effects of foreign exchange intervention:  i) the use of high-frequency data and ii)  the use of 
event studies to evaluate the effects of intervention.  This article surveys recent empirical studies 
of the effect of foreign exchange intervention and analyzes the implicit assumptions and 
limitations of such work.  After explicitly detailing such drawbacks, the paper suggests ways to 
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Foreign exchange intervention is the practice of monetary authorities buying and selling 
currency in the foreign exchange market to influence exchange rates.  Researchers have studied 
whether intervention is successful in influencing exchange rate movements and how it affects 
volatility.  Secondarily, they have asked how the type of intervention affects these results and 
through which channels it might operate.   
Intervention has several characteristics that complicate one’s ability to study it.  It is 
conducted sporadically, with several interventions over the course of a few days or weeks.  Thus, 
it has an unusual distribution.  Intervention policy is rarely stable for long periods.  Finally, 
because intervention quickly reacts to exchange rate movements and other variables, exchange 
rates and intervention are determined simultaneously.  These problems have made it difficult to 
show that central bank intervention has reduced exchange rate volatility or moved the exchange 
rate in the desired direction.  Yet, every central banker surveyed in Neely (2000)—those who 
actually conduct intervention—remains convinced that intervention is effective in changing the 
exchange rate.
1    
Recently two phenomena have advanced our understanding of intervention.  The first is 
the use of event studies to evaluate the effects of intervention.  Generically, an event study is an 
examination of asset price behavior associated with some event, such as a merger, 
announcement, or intervention.  Event studies are used to assess the market’s reaction to the 
event, how the event influenced prices, and whether the market priced the event efficiently.  The 
second advance is the use of high-frequency data—both exchange rates and intervention—to 
better understand the behavior of exchange rates immediately around intervention.  
                                                 
1 Neely (2000) received responses from the central banks of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States.  
  1Despite these advances, inferring the effects of central bank intervention remains 
difficult.  Although describing the data is a worthy and necessary goal, explaining the nature of 
the process by which exchange rates and intervention are jointly determined requires strong 
assumptions, which are rarely explicitly stated.  While many intervention researchers are 
doubtless cognizant of such issues, those less familiar with the literature are probably not well 
aware of them.  The purpose of this article is to selectively review the recent literature on the 
effects of intervention and to analyze the assumptions and limitations of such exercises.
2  
Identifying the assumptions and limitations of the intervention literature is not to condemn those 
procedures.  Rather such recognition enables the limitations to be better understood and 
overcome.  This paper does not expend much effort describing the disparate conclusions of the 
literature.  The Appendix summarizes such conclusions and specific methods for interested 
readers.  
This article first discusses central bank intervention practices and explains how 
researchers typically study intervention.  Selected intervention studies are then discussed.   The 
fourth section considers the assumptions behind intervention studies, with a special emphasis on 
the often implicit assumptions behind the new event-study methodologies.  In its conclusion, the 
article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the methods of studying the effects of 
intervention and suggests avenues for future research.  
1.  CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1973, the 
Articles of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were amended to provide that members 
                                                 
2  This paper is a fairly narrow and selective survey of the intervention literature.  Edison (1993), Sarno and Taylor 
(2001), and Humpage (2004) provide more wide-ranging treatments of intervention studies.  The Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) (2005) provides a range of views on intervention in emerging markets.  
  2“would collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements 
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates.”  IMF members could choose their own 
exchange rate arrangements subject to the proviso that they avoid exchange rate manipulation 
and foster orderly economic growth.  Many countries choose to float their exchange rates and 
conduct occasional foreign exchange intervention to influence the value of their currencies.
3   
Central banks choose to intervene for different reasons.  The Foreign Currency Directive 
of the Federal Reserve System, for example, directs intervention to “counter disorderly market 
conditions,” which has been interpreted differently at different times.
4  Often, excessive 
exchange rate volatility or deviations from long-run equilibrium exchange rates have prompted 
intervention.  Multiple central banks often coordinate intervention, intervening in the same 
direction on the same day.  
The response rule of central bank intervention to economic conditions is known as the 
central bank’s intervention reaction function.  Neely (2002) estimates a typical reaction function 
for U.S. intervention with a friction model.  A friction model permits the dependent variable—
intervention—to be insensitive to its determinants over a range of values (Rosett, 1959).  This is 
appropriate for a variable such as intervention that takes the value zero for a large proportion of 
observations.  The study confirms previous findings that U.S. intervention leans against the wind 
and is conducted to counter misalignment.  “Leaning against the wind” intervention is conducted 
to oppose strong short-term trends.  For example, if the U.S. dollar (USD) has been depreciating, 
a USD purchase would constitute leaning against the wind.  Misalignment means that the 
                                                 
3  In the United States, for example, the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury generally collaborate on foreign 
exchange intervention decisions, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducts operations on behalf of both. 
Humpage (1994) and Cross (1998) describe the institutional aspects of U.S. intervention, whereas Edison (1993) 
reviews the extensive literature on central bank intervention.  
4 The directive mandates intervention in cooperation with foreign central banks, consistent with the International 
Monetary Fund Article IV, Section 1, that forbids attempts to remedy balance-of-payments problems by 
  3exchange rate deviates from what the monetary authorities might regard as long-run 
fundamentals, such as those implied by a purchasing power parity relation.  
Figure 1 shows U.S. intervention in the Deutsche mark (DEM) market, as well as the 
exchange rate, compared with a purchasing power parity-based fundamental value.  Statistical 
analysis confirms the impression that U.S. authorities tend to purchase USD when the USD is 
relatively undervalued and sell USD in the reverse circumstance.  Leahy (1995) and Neely 
(1998) find that U.S. authorities make substantial profits as a result of this intervention strategy.
5   
When a central bank buys (sells) its own currency in exchange for a foreign currency, it 
decreases (increases) the amount of its currency in circulation, lowering (raising) its domestic 
money supply.  By itself, this transaction would influence exchange rates in the same way as 
ordinary domestic open market operations; however, most central banks routinely “sterilize” 
their foreign exchange operations; that is, they buy and sell domestic bonds to reverse the effect 
of the foreign exchange operation on the domestic money supply (Edison, 1993).
6  For example, 
if the Federal Reserve Bank of New York bought $100 million worth of euros (EUR) in a foreign 
exchange intervention, the U.S. monetary base would increase by $100 million in the absence of 
sterilization. Other things equal, interest rates and prices would also change. To prevent changes 
to domestic interest rates and prices, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would sterilize the 
intervention—sell $100 million worth of government securities—and absorb the liquidity. 
Complete sterilization would also require that the foreign central bank—the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in the case of the EUR—automatically reverse the effect of the intervention on the 
foreign money market by increasing the supply of foreign currency through open market 
                                                                                                                                                             
manipulating exchange rates.  “The Foreign Currency Directive” is published annually in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin with the minutes of the first Federal Open Market Committee meeting of each year. 
5 Although U.S. authorities—as with those of many other countries—have profited from their foreign exchange 
intervention activities, this does not mean that profit is the goal of those trades, it is merely a side benefit. 
  4operations. The net effect would be to increase the relative supply of U.S. government securities 
versus foreign securities but to leave domestic and foreign money supplies unchanged.  
Because fully sterilized intervention doesn’t affect either prices or interest rates, it 
doesn’t influence the exchange rate directly. But official intervention might affect the foreign 
exchange market indirectly through the portfolio balance channel and/or the signaling channel.  
The portfolio balance theory recognizes that sterilized intervention changes the relative 
supplies of bonds denominated in different currencies. If bonds in different currencies are 
imperfect substitutes, investors must be compensated with a higher expected return to hold the 
relatively more numerous bonds.  The higher return must result from a change in either the price 
of the bonds or the exchange rate.  
The signaling channel suggests that official intervention communicates, or signals to the 
market, information about future monetary policy or the long-run equilibrium value of the 
exchange rate.  Complicating a belief in the signaling channel is the fact that central banks often 
conduct intervention secretly.  In fact, 77 percent of central banks report that they sometimes or 
always conduct intervention secretly to maximize market impact (Neely, 2000).  
2.  ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION 
The most important questions confronting researchers on intervention are as follows:  
What effect does intervention have on the level and volatility of exchange rates?  To what 
conditions do central banks respond?  Secondarily, how do factors such as coordination, 
direction, secrecy, and amount of intervention affect the answers to those questions?   
Researchers have used at least three types of studies to investigate these questions:  By 
far the most common type of study has been a time-series event study.  More recently, 
                                                                                                                                                             
6  Conducting monetary policy by way of a short-term interest rate target automatically sterilizes intervention. 
  5researchers have pursued a different type of event study in which interventions are grouped into 
clusters and the effect of the cluster is considered as one event.  These will be termed other event 
studies.  Both types of event studies examine the behavior of exchange rates around intervention, 
without making explicit assumptions about the data-generating process.  The third—and least 
common—type of study is an explicitly identified structural analysis of the effects of 
intervention.  We briefly describe each of these procedures before proceeding to a literature 
review.   
Time-Series Event Studies 
Time-series event studies have a long history:  Humpage (1984) and Dominguez and 
Frankel (1993) are two early efforts.  Such studies typically investigate the effect of intervention 
on returns using a single equation in which intervention (It) and a limited set of regressors 
explain the change in the exchange rate ( ) t S ∆ :   
(1)    t t t r t e Ax I c S + + + = ∆ 1 β , 
where {cr,β, A} is the coefficient vector, St is units of foreign currency per unit of domestic 
currency, and the set of regressors x1t might include interest rate differentials or macroeconomic 
news or other variables that might influence the exchange rate.  How the data are timed is 
important in such regressions.  Variables are usually defined so that intervention at time t would 
occur during the exchange rate change of the same date.  In other words, if exchange rates are 
collected at the end of the business day,  ( ) / ln = ∆ 1 − t t t S S S , then intervention explains 
contemporaneous exchange rate changes.  Such studies interpret the coefficient β as the effect of 
intervention on exchange rate changes.  
  6  Recently, researchers have begun studying the effect of intervention on option-implied 
volatility (IV), implied skewness, kurtosis, and even correlations by using a regression setup 
similar to (1) (Campa and Chang, 1998).
7  Such studies have most of the strengths and 
limitations of studies of the effect of intervention on returns.   
  The other common way to study the effect of intervention on volatility is with a GARCH 
(1,1) model (Bollerslev, 1986) in which intervention and other variables can influence exchange 
rate conditional variance (ht) contemporaneously, as follows:   
(2)    .         
2
11 tt t hh e ωβ α −− =+ + + I t b I
Such specifications frequently also include lagged values of intervention and/or indicator 
variables for weekends and holidays as explanatory variables in the GARCH model.  Again, 
studies interpret the coefficient on intervention (bI) as the effect of intervention on volatility.  
  Although it is not the subject of this paper, it is worth noting that there is also a large—
and usually unconnected—literature estimating intervention reaction functions.  Such studies 
usually describe intervention as a function of contemporaneous and past exchange rate changes 
and volatility, lagged intervention, and deviations from some exchange rate target: 













Limited dependent variable frameworks, such as the friction model of Rosett (1959) or Tobin’s 
(1958) Tobit model, are often applied to intervention because of its unusual distribution.   
Other Event Studies 
The second class of event study typically uses data only from around periods of 
intervention, ignoring the behavior of exchange rates when there is no intervention.  Such studies 
                                                 
7 Option-implied volatility, implied skewness, and implied kurtotis are measures of the second, third, and fourth 
  7provide a seemingly natural way to model the sporadic nature of intervention. As Fatum and 
Hutchinson note, 
“An event study framework is better suited to the study of sporadic and intense periods of 
official intervention, juxtaposed with continuously changing exchange rates, than 
standard time-series studies. Focusing on daily Bundesbank and US official intervention 
operations, we identify separate intervention ‘episodes’ and analyse the subsequent effect 
on the exchange rate.” — Fatum and Hutchison (2003a, 2003b, p. 390)  
To conduct an event study, one must define the events, a window around the event, a 
success criterion, and a method of evaluating the success criterion.  Events might be defined as a 
single intervention or a series of interventions in the same direction within a short time.  
Windows are typically chosen to be from 1 to 30 days.  The exchange rate behavior in the pre-
event window is compared with exchange rate behavior in the post-event window.   
Choosing an event window requires one to make trade-offs.  Longer event windows 
permit researchers to judge the overall effect of related interventions.  On the other hand, longer 
windows increase the danger of omitting important variables that influence exchange rates.  
Perhaps more seriously, monetary authorities might intervene until the exchange rate moves in 
the desired direction.  Even if intervention has no influence on exchange rates, if the authority 
keeps intervening until it observes the desired outcome, then intervention appears to be 
successful.  Longer event windows increase this danger.  
Researchers have considered various success criteria.  The most commonly used are the 
direction criterion and the smoothing criterion (Humpage, 2000).  The direction criterion defines 
intervention as successful if the purchased currency appreciates after an intervention.  That is, a 
                                                                                                                                                             
moments of the distribution of the underlying asset that are obtained from options prices.  Neely (2005c) discusses 
implied volatility in some detail. 
  8USD purchase would be successful if the dollar appreciated in the post-event window.  But, 
mindful that most intervention is “against the wind”—that is, the authorities are buying the 
currency that is depreciating—one might also consider an official purchase to be successful if the 
purchased currency depreciates less in the post-event window than in the pre-event window.  The 
standard that the intervention should moderate the pre-event trend in the exchange rate is known 
as the smoothing criterion. 
Once the success criterion is defined, one needs some method to evaluate whether it has 
been achieved.  In strictly narrative studies, the researcher might simply graph the data or 
compute simple summary statistics, such as the percentage of successes or mean change in the 
exchange rate, to informally judge whether intervention has been successful.  Otherwise, one 
formally tests whether differences between pre- and post-event behavior are statistically 
significant.   
Humpage (1999 and 2000), for example, examines whether one can reject that the 
observed number of exchange rate changes of a given type (e.g., depreciations) come from a null 
distribution.
8  In other words, for example, does the Japanese yen (JPY) depreciate more often 
than one would expect when the Fed sells JPY for USD?  The number of successes under the 
null of no effect is distributed as a hypergeometric random variable.  Humpage goes on to test 
whether successful interventions are related to factors such as amount, coordination, and secrecy 
by regressing success indicators on those factors in a probit framework.  
Fatum and Hutchison (2003a) similarly test whether the number of “successful” 
interventions is greater than one would expect if intervention were ineffective.  And they use a 
“matched sample” t-test to ask whether the mean post-intervention exchange rate change is 
  9statistically significantly different from the mean pre-intervention change.   
3.  STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION 
  Event studies have recently gained greater popularity, particularly those that consider a 
cluster of interventions as one event and/or use nonparametric methods to evaluate the success of 
those interventions.  The difficulties of applying traditional structural econometric techniques—
simultaneity, identification, the unusual distribution of intervention—have doubtless played a 
significant role in the rise of such studies.  This section first enumerates some recent event 
studies before considering some explicitly identified investigations of intervention.   
Event Studies with Daily Data 
Many papers using daily intervention and exchange rate data describe themselves as 
event studies: Fatum and Hutchison (2003a, 2003b), Edison, Cashin, and Liang (2003).  Other 
papers can reasonably be described as event studies—even though they do not use that term—
because they characterize the behavior of exchange rates around periods of intervention, without 
explicitly identifying a structural relation:  Humpage (1999, 2000), Aguilar and Nydalh (2000), 
Kim, Kortian and Sheen (2000), Ito (2002), and Chaboud and Humpage (2005).  Such studies 
provide mixed support for the hypothesis that intervention influences exchange rates in the 
desired direction and also mixed conclusions as to its effect on volatility.  Coordinated 
interventions were usually found to be more successful than unilateral interventions.  
Intraday Event Studies 
More recently, a third group of papers have used intraday data to evaluate the behavior of 
exchange rates at very high frequencies around the times of intervention.  Fischer and Zurlinden 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Humpage’s studies can be interpreted as time-series event studies in which the regressand is an indicator variable 
that depends on the behavior of exchange rates, conditional on intervention. Such tests use all the exchange rate 
  10(1999), Payne and Vitale (2003), and Pasquariello (2002) have exploited the fact that the Swiss 
National Bank has released data on the exact times of intervention, not just the day and amount.  
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) look at irregularly timed observations at times of intervention to 
examine the effects of intervention.  Payne and Vitale (2003) use exchange rate data sampled at 
15-minute intervals to quantify the effects of intervention operations on the U.S. dollar/Swiss 
franc (USD/CHF) rate.  Pasquariello (2002) looks at a wider variety of exchange rate behavior—
including spreads—in a similar exercise.  Beattie and Fillion (1999) use confidential timed 
intervention data from the Bank of Canada to similarly investigate the intraday effects of 
Canadian intervention.  Fatum and King (2005) compare the effects of Canadian intervention on 
high-frequency data over periods with both rule-based and discretionary intervention.  They find 
that intervention does systematically affect the CAD/USD rate and might be associated with 
reduced volatility.  Finally, Dominguez (2003a, 2003b) regresses 5-minute exchange rate returns 
and 5-minute volatility on leads and lags of news announcement and intervention news 
dummies—taken from Reuters’ reports, collected by Olsen and Associates—during days of U.S. 
intervention from 1987 to 1993.  Dominguez interprets the coefficients on intervention and news 
dummies as showing the impact of those events on exchange rate behavior at that horizon.  The 
consensus of these papers has been that interventions successfully move exchange rates, at least 
in the very short term.   
Identified Studies of Intervention 
  Not all studies of intervention can be classified as event studies.  Some explicitly model 
structural economic relations to identify the effect of intervention on exchange rate behavior.
9  
                                                                                                                                                             
data, not just data around interventions.   
9  In models derived from a microeconomic optimization problem, the parameters are often termed “deep” structural 
parameters and will be invariant to changes in the economic environment.  This paper uses the more traditional 
meaning of what are sometimes called pseudo-structural parameters—they have economic interpretations.  
  11Three such studies are those of Kim (2003), Kearns and Rigobon (2005), and Neely (2005b).
  Kim (2003), for example, estimates a structural vector autoregression (VAR) adapted 
from the monetary policy literature to examine the effects of intervention and monetary policy on 
a trade-weighted exchange rate.  The monthly data span 1974:01–1996:12 and include the ratio 
of foreign exchange intervention to a quadratic trend in the monetary base, the federal funds rate, 
monetary aggregates, the consumer price index, industrial production, the trade-weighted 
exchange rate, and commodity prices.  The specification permits two-way contemporaneous 
interaction between intervention and exchange rates, the federal funds rate and the monetary 
aggregates, and the federal funds rate and commodity prices.  The inclusion of monetary policy 
measures and macro variables might mitigate the problem of omitted variables bias:  If some 
independent variables are omitted from a relation, then one will generally not get consistent 
estimates of coefficients on correlated regressors.  Unfortunately, the low-frequency monthly 
macro data will miss the important high-frequency interactions and complicates the task of 
sorting out the interaction between intervention and exchange rates.
10  Thus, Kim (2003) 
estimates a rich set of macroeconomic relations and policy interactions, at the price of greater 
simultaneity bias and possibly noisier parameter estimates from lower-frequency data.   
  Neely (2005a) shows, however, that some parameters are not identified in Kim’s (2003) 
study.  Identification requires that one have at least as many estimable moments from the 
reduced form as there are structural parameters.  But that is only a necessary condition (i.e., the 
order condition) to identify all the parameters; it is not sufficient.  Unfortunately, the system fails 
the rank condition (Hamilton, 1994).  A subset of the parameters—including those governing the 
cross-reactions of exchange rates and intervention—appear to be unidentified.  This calls the 
                                                 
10 Kim (2003) does make an effort to capture the higher-frequency interaction with a separate exercise.  
  12estimated impulse responses into question, though they might be interpreted as a set (not unique) 
of impulse responses that are consistent with the data. 
  Kearns and Rigobon (2005) perform an innovative study that takes advantage of 
structural breaks in the Japanese and Australian authorities’ reaction functions to estimate a 
nonlinear model of intervention.
11  The first equation describes the reaction of the exchange rate 
return to intervention, It, exogenous variables, zt, and an exchange rate shock, εt:  
(4)     t t t t z I S ε γ β + + = ∆  . 
The second equation is a central bank reaction function that describes the “shadow” intervention 
level, It
*, as a function of exchange rate changes (∆St) and exogenous variables:  
(5)      t t t t z S I η δ + + ∆ =
*
The third equation models the binary decision to intervene if shadow intervention exceeds some 
threshold.  I(*) is an indicator function that equals 1 if its argument is true, and 0 otherwise:  
(6)    ()
**
tt t I Ind I I I => ⋅ . 
This simplified model has seven parameters of interest  } , , , , , , { z I σ σ σ δ γ β η ε , but there 
are only five moments of the data: the probability of intervention, the variance of the exchange 
rate when there is no intervention, and the 3 elements of the covariance matrix when an 
intervention has taken place.  Clearly, one cannot estimate seven independent structural 
parameters with five moments.   
But, if one allows for the break in the threshold of intervention, then the threshold takes the 
low value,  l I , prior to the break in the reaction function at t  and the high value,  ˆ
h I , after the 
break.  The intervention decision can be expressed as follows: 
                                                 
11 This simplified version of the model suppresses constants and lags to facilitate the explanation of the 
identification scheme.  









Ind I I I t t
I





Allowing for the break in the reaction function and assuming that other structural parameters do 
not change after the break, the model has one more structural parameter— } , { h l I I  instead of 
} {I —but one can compute 10 moments from the data:  5 from the pre-break period and 5 from 
the post-break period.  The system now can be identified.
12   
Kearns and Rigobon (2005) estimate the model by the simulated method of moments and 
interpret their estimates of β as indicating that intervention has a large effect on the Australian 
dollar/U.S. dollar (AUD/USD) exchange rate and a smaller effect on the JPY/USD rate.  The 
baseline model estimates that a sale of $100 million is associated with a 1.81 percent AUD 
appreciation but just a 0.2 percent JPY appreciation.  Kearns and Rigobon (2005) go on to 
calculate impulse response functions for more elaborate models, emphasizing the importance of 
estimating dynamic responses. 
Neely (2005b) identifies the cross-effects of intervention with the level and volatility of 
exchange rates using the likely timing of intervention, macroeconomic announcements as 
instruments, and the nonlinear structure of the U.S. intervention reaction function.  Proper 
identification of the effects of intervention indicates that it is moderately effective in changing 
the levels of exchange rates but has no significant effect on volatility.  The paper also illustrates 
that such inference depends on seemingly innocuous identification assumptions. 
                                                 
12 Of course, even if one has more estimable moments from the data than parameters to estimate, that does not 
guarantee identification, but a lack of sufficient moments does preclude it.  
  14ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND EVENT AND STRUCTURAL STUDIES OF INTERVENTION 
  An important goal in studying intervention and exchange rate behavior is to ascertain the 
effect of intervention on exchange rates.  An event study, by definition, looks at the behavior of 
an asset price (e.g., exchange rates) around periods of intervention.  This does not necessarily 
mean, however, that intervention causes the exchange rate behavior.  To determine the effect of 
intervention on exchange rates, one must consider how all the variables that influence exchange 
rates and intervention interact.  
A System of Exchange Rates and Intervention 
  Consider a simple but general case (equation (8)) in which exchange rate returns and 
intervention potentially depend on one lag of returns and intervention and the exogenous 
variables x1t and x2t: 
(8)   
11 11 12 11 12
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where E[uu’] = Ω.
13  In this system, β governs the contemporaneous reaction of exchange rate 
returns to intervention and δ governs the reaction of intervention to exchange rate returns.   
  The simultaneous determination of exchange rate returns and intervention will generate 
the most immediate problem—acknowledged by most researchers—in inferring the effects of 
intervention on exchange rates:  A simple regression of exchange rate returns on 
contemporaneous intervention will produce inconsistent estimates of β because intervention will 
be correlated with the estimated error: 
“…the issue of endogeneity arises in our study (and every intervention study) 
since the central bank usually takes its cue to intervene on the basis of observed 
exchange rate movements.”   
  15— Fatum and Hutchison (2003b, p. 392) 
  The most common method to deal with this simultaneity is to use an instrumental 
variables procedure.  To estimate β consistently, one would find an instrument for intervention—
a variable correlated with intervention but uncorrelated with the shock to exchange rates—and 
perform a two-stage least squares or a similar instrumental variables procedure.   
A slightly subtler problem is that equation (8) contains more structural parameters—β,δ, 
a11, a12, a21, a22, b11, b12, b21, b22, cr, cI, Ω11, Ω12, Ω22, (15)—than moments estimable from the 
reduced form (13):  
(9) 
11 11 21 12 22 11 21 12 22
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.
14 
The fact that there are more structural parameters in the structural system than moments 
estimably from the reduced form means that some of the structural parameters are not identified.   
  Simultaneity can contribute to a failure of identification.  For example, if β were equal to 
zero—intervention does not cause returns—then all the structural parameters of the returns 
equation would be identified, but one would still not be able to uniquely identify δ and the 
structural shocks’ covariance (Ω12).  Simultaneity requires specific estimation methods to obtain 
consistent estimates of parameters; identification means that some estimation methods can 
consistently estimate the parameters.  
 
13 This equation ignores the nonlinear nature of intervention.  This feature of the data will be discussed later.  
14 If intervention is modeled as a limited dependent variable that takes non-zero values only when its determinants 
exceed some threshold, the reduced form actually depends on whether intervention takes the value zero or not.  The 
reduced from in (9) is true for non-zero values of intervention.  
  16Structural Breaks as a Source of Identification 
The usual way to achieve identification is to restrict the structural parameters in a way 
that allows one to uniquely solve for those parameters from the estimable moments.  For 
example, one might assume that certain regressors don’t appear in some equations in a system—
which restricts their structural coefficient to be zero—or that certain endogenous variables do not 
affect each other contemporaneously.   
Identification can also be achieved in less traditional ways, however.  Changes in the 
structure of the economy can also offer sources of information that help to identify structural 
parameters.
15  For example, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) take advantage of the fact that both the 
Japanese and Australian authorities changed their intervention procedures to make intervention 
larger but less frequent.  In other words, thresholds for intervention increased.   
Can instability be exploited to achieve identification? 
  The use of structural breaks to identify structural parameters is potentially dangerous, 
however, because such exercises might be subject to the Lucas critique.
16  Lucas (1976) argued 
that evaluating alternative policies using reduced-form econometric models would often produce 
misleading results because such policies would produce different expectations and different 
behavior.  That is, reduced-form models are not stable when the rules of the economy change.  
In the present context, central bank intervention functions are notoriously unstable over 
time, meaning that the structural parameters of an econometric model—e.g., (8)—might not be 
stable when the economic environment changes.  Estimation of an intervention model will 
                                                 
15 Other sorts of variation in the data can also be used to identify models.  Rigobon and Sack (2003), for example, 
take advantage of heteroskedasticity in stock market returns to measure the reaction of monetary policy to the stock 
market. 
16 Noting that the Kearns and Rigobon (2005) study is potentially subject to the Lucas Critique is not a particularly 
damning criticism of their work.  Even studies, such as that of Kearns and Rigobon (2005), that pay careful attention 
  17provide results that are specific to the size of the market and intervention and the nature of the 
reaction function, including the purpose of intervention.  Intuitively, the signaling channel 
depends on intervention signaling future monetary policy or coordinating expectations.  If 
intervention is instead conducted randomly, then it will contain no information and will not 
influence exchange rates.   
Although Kearns and Rigobon (2005) exploit the instability of Japanese and Australian 
reaction functions to identify their model, instability is an unacknowledged problem for many 
studies of central bank intervention.  If the rules for how intervention is conducted change—as 
they frequently do—the structural and reduced-form parameters will generally change too.   
Event Studies vs. the Structural System 
An event study is essentially a single-equation model that looks at the contemporaneous 
interaction of intervention and exchange rates.  One can use single-equation methods to examine 
the effects of intervention on exchange rates, but this doesn’t rescue the econometrician from 
making assumptions about the structure of the economy—though it often hides those 
assumptions.  For example, suppose that one investigated the effect of intervention on exchange 
rate returns by estimating the following single-equation regression by ordinary least squares 
(OLS):  
(1)       t t t r t e Ax I c S + + + = ∆ 1 β , 
where ∆St , x1t and It are defined as before.  When does an event study correctly estimate the 
structural impact of intervention on returns?   
                                                                                                                                                             
to identification must make simplifying assumptions about the structure of the economy.  Such assumptions are 
almost always subject to some criticism. 
  18Daily Event Studies and Simultaneity 
The first problem to note is that OLS estimates of β would suffer from simultaneous 
equations bias, unless exchange rate returns did not affect intervention contemporaneously (δ=0) 
and the structural errors were uncorrelated.  Such assumptions might be tenable in the very-high-
frequency (intraday) event studies of Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Beattie and Fillion (1999) 
Payne and Vitale (2003), Pasquariello (2002), and Dominguez (2003a, 2003b).  But they are 
certainly not tenable with the daily data needed to determine longer-term responses.   
To correct for simultaneous equations bias, some researchers would use an instrumental-
variables procedure, such as two-stage least squares (TSLS), to estimate (1).  But this would 
require instruments that are reliably correlated with It but not with ∆St.  Such instruments are 
difficult to find because foreign exchange intervention policy is determined by factors that could 
well affect ∆St.  And using such instruments to estimate the effect of It on ∆St implicitly 
constitute identification restrictions because one must exclude the instruments from the structural 
form of the ∆St equation.  If the instrument could not be excluded from the ∆St equation, then the 
estimated TSLS coefficient would be an inconsistent estimate of β.  Unfortunately, the 
identifying restrictions used in single-equation models are very rarely explicitly thought out or 
discussed, leaving it to the reader to determine what they are and whether they are appropriate.   
Finding good instruments is important.  The literature on instrumental variables has 
shown that weak instruments—those not strongly predictive of the regressor—will provide very 
poor estimates of the coefficients.  To summarize the long literature on choosing instrument sets, 
one would like a parsimonious instrument set that strongly predicts the regressor.  For good 
distributional results, Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) provide a function that specifies desired F-
  19statistics as a function of the number of instruments.  For one instrument, they recommend an F-
statistic of 10. 
Some researchers have tried to avoid the simultaneity bias by using the lagged value of 
intervention as the regressor (Huang and Neun, 2004).  This practice will not provide the right 
answer, however.  In the simplest case, with no simultaneity and no other regressors, it would 
have to be the case that  
(10)    () ( 1 − = t t t t I r E I r E )
for lagged intervention to provide the correct coefficient for the contemporaneous effect.  If one 
assumes a simple linear model for intervention ( t t t I I ε ρ + = −1 ), then (10) can hold only if 
intervention is a martingale (ρ = 1), but this conflicts with the mild positive autocorrelation in 
intervention.
17  Further, if intervention were an integrated process (ρ = 1), then a regression of 
exchange rate returns (I(0)) on intervention (I(1)) would be inappropriate because the residuals 
could not be stationary.  Using lagged intervention as the regressor can only properly estimate 
the response to past intervention, not contemporaneous intervention. It does not resolve 
simultaneity.  
It is worth noting that event studies that eschew regression analysis do not avoid the 
simultaneity problem, as acknowledged by Fatum and Hutchison (2003b).  Whether one actually 
estimates a regression or uses a nonparametric technique such as the matched sample test or 
Humpage’s discrete distribution methods, if intervention and exchange rates influence each other 
within the day, then one cannot estimate the impact of intervention on exchange rates (β) 
consistently, unless one uses appropriate assumptions and estimation methods.   
                                                 
17 A martingale process is one whose conditional expectation at t+1 is the value of the variable at t:  Et(Z(t+1)) = 
Z(t). 
  20To see such bias, consider a system in which intervention and exchange rates are 
determined simultaneously and the errors are jointly normal—for tractability.  For simplicity, 










∆ − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎡⎤























And, under the null that intervention has no effect on exchange rates (β = 0) and that the 
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The conditional expectation of  t t I S | ∆  is a well known property of the bivariate normal 
distribution:   
(13)  [] t
I
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σ
σ
ρ = ∆ |   
Humpage’s procedure measures the probability of dollar depreciation, conditional on dollar sales 
(i.e.,  ).  If δ is less than zero, as is likely if authorities lean against the wind, 
then the correlation between intervention and exchange rate returns will be negative (ρ < 0).  
This means that the conditional expectation of the exchange rate return will be positive when the 
authorities sell dollars , although intervention has no effect on exchange 
rates.  Because the conditional expectation of ∆S
( 0 | 0 < < ∆ t t I S P )
)
)
() ( 0 0 | 1 > < ∆ − t t t I S E
t is positive and the normal distribution is 
symmetric, the probability of observing a dollar depreciation (∆St < 0) when the authorities sell 
dollars is less than 50 percent  () ( 5 . 0 0 | 0 < < < ∆ t t I S P , despite the fact that intervention has no 
  21effect on exchange rates in this model (β  = 0).  An econometrician estimating this probability 
will find that intervention has fewer successes than one would expect under independence 
between exchange rates and intervention.  This occurs because the intervention reaction function 
depends on exchange rate changes—the authorities lean against the wind.  This example 
illustrates that simultaneity will bias the estimates of the effect of intervention in all event 
studies, whether they are explicitly regressions or not.
18  
Intraday Studies and Simultaneity 
  An advantage of intraday studies is that one can avoid simultaneity under two 
assumptions:  i)  the timing of intervention is measured precisely enough;  and ii)  the decision 
interval of the monetary authority is less than the data frequency used.  In other words, if one 
uses 5-minute data, the monetary authority takes at least 5 minutes to react to market 
developments and intervene.  Under these assumptions, there is no contemporaneous impact of 
exchange rates on intervention and no simultaneity—changes after the intervention are the result 
of the intervention and not vice versa.  This advantage comes at a price, however.  If intervention 
timing is not correctly known, then the effect of intervention will not be estimated correctly.  For 
example, if one assumes that intervention happens before it actually does, then the effect of 
intervention will appear to be the conditions that prompt intervention.  If intervention is thought 
to occur later than it actually does, then the study will estimate the lagged effect of intervention, 
which will probably be smaller than the immediate effect.  Fischer (2005) implicitly criticizes the 
reliance on Reuters’ reports used by Dominguez (2003a, 2003b) by showing that such reports 
were fairly inaccurate for Swiss intervention, whose exact times are known.   
                                                 
18  One could argue, of course, that the presence of leaning-against-the-wind intervention biases tests of the effect of 
intervention toward finding a perverse effect or no effect and that such tests are therefore conservative.  But the 
important point is that such tests are unreliable for finding the correct answer.   
  22Although intraday studies of intervention have been tremendously valuable in 
understanding the immediate impact of intervention for these data, several potential problems 
remain, aside from timing issues.  First, the paucity of periods/countries for which exact 
intervention timing is publicly available—only Switzerland over one 9-year period—means that 
any conclusions from these studies cannot be cross-checked in other samples.  Inference could be 
dangerously fragile.  Second, the very short-run effect of intervention might be dominated by 
transitory effects such as portfolio rebalancing.  One cannot rule out the idea that intervention 
has its full effects over days or weeks.  About 40 percent of central bankers surveyed by Neely 
(2000) believed that intervention takes at least a few days to have its full effect.
19  Therefore, 
intraday event studies do not answer the question:  What is the dynamic response of the 
exchange rate to intervention?  The next section expands on what is required to correctly answer 
this question.  
Dynamic Impacts 
  A correctly estimated regression coefficient describes the static impact of one variable on 
another.  But one would prefer to estimate the dynamic impact on exchange rates of a shock to 
intervention.   That is, a shock to the intervention process will impact exchange rates, which in 
turn might affect future exchange rates and intervention.  In a VAR, the moving average 
representation summarizes the dynamic impacts of shocks on the variables in the system.  
When does an event study estimate the dynamic impact correctly?  Correctly estimating 
the dynamic impact of a shock to intervention on exchange rates requires even more stringent 
assumptions than correctly estimating the static impact (β).  All the equations for the endogenous 
                                                 
19 The conclusion that intervention takes hours or days to achieve its full effect contrasts with the finding in the 
announcement literature that markets fully adjust to announcements within minutes.  The secrecy with which 
intervention is conducted, however, might delay the adjustment.  
  23variables in the system (at least exchange rates and intervention) must be correctly estimated, 
which means identifying all the structural parameters and constructing the dynamic impact of a 
shock to intervention.  The nonlinearity of intervention complicates such an exercise, however.  
A friction model can characterize intervention’s reaction to explanatory variables such as 
contemporaneous and past returns and volatility (Rosett, 1959).  Such a model permits the 
dependent variable—intervention—to be insensitive to the independent variables over a range of 
values.
20  This is appropriate for a variable like intervention that takes the value zero for a large 
proportion of observations.  The following is a friction model:   
(14)  22 ttt I I t I SA xcu δ
− =∆ + + +    if    0 < t I  
         i f     0 = t I 0 = t I , 
   22 ttt I I t I SA xcu δ
+ =∆ + − +    if      0 > t I
where x2t is a vector of all structural explanatory variables and lags of endogenous variables 
excluding the constant.   
 Note that in a friction model, the value of the intercept term depends on the sign of 
intervention.  This complicates estimation of the intervention equation and the construction of 
dynamic impulse responses.  The structural model when intervention is positive is as follows: 
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20  Rosett (1959) describes the friction model as an extension of the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958).   Maddala (1986) 
provides a very readable introduction to limited dependent-variable models, such as the friction and Tobit models.  
Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) used a friction model to study central bank reaction functions.  
  24 When intervention equals zero, however, the first structural and reduced-form equations 
coincide as follows:   
(17)    rt r t t u c x A S + + = ∆ 1 1 . 
And the reduced form for It implies the following:   
(18)    11 22 11 22 tt r I r t I t tt r I A xA x c c uu A xA x c c δδ δ δδ
− + −− − − < − < −− − + . 
  Because the reduced form for the exchange rate depends on the value of intervention, the 
nonlinearity can aid in identification of the structural parameters.  Neely (2005b) develops an 
argument of Sickles and Schmidt (1978) to show that the parameters of the structural exchange 
rate equation are identifiable without instruments or restricting the structural covariance matrix.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper selectively reviews and analyzes the recent literature on intervention to 
suggest areas for further progress.  The examination was spurred by two recent trends that have 
contributed to the study of central bank intervention:  i) the use of high-frequency data and ii) the 
event-study methodology.  The event study technique has been motivated by the argument that it 
is better suited to study the sporadic, clustered intervention process.  And high-frequency data 
seem to mitigate the simultaneity bias plaguing daily studies.   
In the context of a selective review of the literature on the effects of interventions, this 
paper has argued that even nonparametric event studies are still subject to all the econometric 
problems that beset more conventional econometric procedures.  An examination of simultaneity 
in a nonparametric event study illustrated this point.  Event studies will correctly infer the 
structural effects of intervention only under fairly strong conditions.  Recognition of the 
assumptions explicit in and analysis of the limitations of the procedures are not criticisms of 
  25intervention studies.  Rather, explicit identification of drawbacks enables researchers to assess 
results more realistically and improve their procedures. 
With respect to structural studies, this paper shows that the effects of intervention in 
Kim’s (2003) rich macroeconomic model are not identified and cautions that the innovative work 
of Kearns and Rigobon (2005) is potentially subject to the Lucas critique.   
Finally, the paper also argues that the nonlinearity of intervention—which has largely 
been ignored in the literature on the effects of intervention—could be helpful in identifying the 
effects of intervention and overcoming simultaneity.   
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volatility after a co-ordinated CBI. It highlights new findings on the timing 
and the persistence of coordinated interventions on exchange rate volatility, 
on important volatility spillovers, on the impact on exchange rate 
covariances and correlations and on skewness coefficients. The empirical 
findings are partly in line with the predictions of a theoretical model for 
central bank interventions developed by Vitale (1999). 
Brandner, Peter; Grech, Harald and Stix, 
Helmut. “The Effectiveness of 
Central Bank Intervention in the 
EMS: The Post 1993 Experience.” 
Working Paper 55, Oesterreichische 


















The results from the EGARCH models show that interventions influenced 
the conditional mean in only one case. Both volatility increasing and 
decreasing effects are found for the conditional variance. In the MS-ARCH 
model more effects on the mean are found. If significant, intervention tends 
to affect the level of the six ERM I exchange rates only in periods of low 
and medium volatility. For the conditional variance more volatility 
decreasing than increasing effects are found. Overall, given our approaches 
(EGARCH and MS-ARCH), the results show that even in the same 
institutional framework, intervention does not seem to affect the means and 
variances in a consistent and predictable manner.  
  34Castren, Olli. “Do Options Implied Rnd 
Functions On G3 Currencies Move 
Around The Times Of Interventions 
On The Jpy/Usd Exchange Rate?” 
Working Paper 410, European 
Central Bank, 2004. 
Japan 
United States 









…interventions on the JPY/USD exchange rate coincide with systematic 
changes in all moments of the estimated risk-neutral density functions 
(RNDs) on the JPY/USD currency pair, and in several of the moments of 
the estimated RNDs on the JPY/EUR and USD/EUR currency pairs. In 
particular, the operations where Japanese yen is sold coincide with a 
movement in the mean of the RND towards a weaker yen both against the 
US dollar and the euro, as well as with an increase in implied standard 
deviations. Prior to the interventions, the RNDs tend to move into opposite 
direction suggesting, on the average, increasingly unfavourable market 
conditions and leaning-against-the wind by the Japanese authorities. 
Chaboud, Alain P. and Humpage, Owen 
F. “An Assessment of the Impact of 
Japanese Foreign Exchange 
Intervention: 1991-2004.” Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, International Finance 
Discussion Papers, No. 824, 
January 2005. 
Japan      1991–2002  USD/JPY  Daily Other
event 
The effectiveness of Japanese interventions over the past decade depended 
in large part on the frequency and size of the transactions. Prior to June 
1995, Japanese interventions only had value as a forecast that the previous 
day’s yen appreciation or depreciation would moderate during the current 
day. After June 1995, Japanese purchases of dollars had value as a forecast 
that the yen would depreciate. Probit analysis confirms that large, 
infrequent interventions, which characterized the later period, had a higher 
likelihood of success than small, frequent interventions. 
Disyatat, Piti and Galati, Gabriele. “The 
Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange 
Intervention in Emerging Market 
Countries: Evidence from the 
Czech Koruna.” Working Paper 
172, Bank for International 













We find that central bank intervention had some (weakly) statistically 
significant impact on the spot rate and the risk reversal but that this impact 
was small. We do not find evidence that intervention had an influence on 
short-term exchange rate volatility. We also find that, in our sample period, 
Czech authorities appeared to intervene mainly in response to an 
acceleration of the speed of koruna appreciation. 
Dominguez, Kathryn. “Foreign Exchange 
Intervention: Did it Work in the 
1990s?” Prepared for “The Dollar” 
Conference Sponsored by the 
Institute for International 
Economics in Washington, D.C., 













This study examines the intervention operations of the G3 countries (the 
United States, Japan and Germany) over the period 1990 through 2002. I 
analyze the very short-term (four-hour) effects of G3 intervention 
operations on dollar exchange rates, as well as the longer-term correlations 
between episodes of intervention and subsequent currency movements. The 
more recent G3 intervention data suggest that intervention policy is both 
alive and well – G3 central banks continue to intervene to influence 
currency values -- and these interventions were often successful in 
influencing short and longer-term exchange rate movements. 
Dominguez, Kathryn. “The Market 
Microstructure of Central Bank 
Intervention.” Journal of 
International Economics, 2003a, 










…some traders typically know that the Fed is intervening at least one hour 
prior to the public release of the information in newswire reports. Also, the 
evidence suggests that the timing of intervention operations matters – 
interventions that occur during heavy trading volume and that are closely 
timed to scheduled macro announcements are the most likely to have large 
effects. Finally, results indicate that interventions that are coordinated with 
another central bank are more likely to be effective than are unilateral 
interventions.  
Dominguez, Kathryn. “When Do Central 
Bank Interventions Influence Intra-
Daily And Longer-Term Exchange 
Rate Movements?” NBER Working 
Paper 9875, National Bureau of 















Using intra-daily and daily exchange rate and intervention data, the paper 
analyzes the influence of interventions on exchange rate volatility, finding 
evidence of both within day and daily impact effects, but little evidence that 
interventions increase longer-term volatility. 
  35Edison, Hali J.; Cashin, Paul A. and 
Liang, Hong. “Foreign Exchange 
Intervention and the Australian 
Dollar: Has It Mattered?” 
International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper, May 2003. 








…over the period 1997-2001, the RBA has had some success in its 
intervention operations, by moderating the depreciating tendency of the 
Australian dollar. Second, we investigate the effects of RBA intervention 
policies on exchange rate volatility over the floating rate period. Our results 
indicate that intervention operations tend to be associated with an increase 
in exchange rate volatility, which suggests that official intervention may 
have added to market uncertainty. Overall, the effects of RBA intervention 
are quite modest on both the level and the volatility of the Australian dollar 
exchange rate. 
Fatum, Rasmus. “Post-Plaza Intervention 
in the DEM/USD Exchange Rate.” 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 
2002, 35(3), pp. 556-67. 
Germany 
United States  
1 September 





Daily    Other
event 
The results suggest that central banks can, in fact, improve the likelihood of 
success primarily through coordination and that unilateral intervention 
conducted by the Bundesbank appears to have been destabilizing. 
Furthermore, it is shown that relatively infrequent intervention has a higher 
likelihood of success.  
Fatum, Rasmus. “Daily Effects of 
Foreign Exchange Intervention: 
Evidence from Official Bank of 
Canada Data.” Working Paper # 
05-12, Santa Cruz Center for 
International Economics, March 
2005. 
Canada        January  1995
– September 
1998 
  CAD/USD Daily Other
event 
…Bank of Canada intervention was systematically associated with both a 
change in the direction and a smoothing of the CAD/USD exchange rate. 
Bank of Canada intervention did not, however, succeed in reducing the 
volatility of the CAD/USD exchange rate. Additionally, the paper 
introduces the issue of currency co-movements to the intervention literature. 
It is shown that the effects of intervention are weakened when adjusting for 
general currency co-movements against the USD, suggesting that currency 
co-movements should be taken into account when addressing the effects of 
central bank intervention aimed at managing a minor currency vis-à-vis a 
major currency. 
Fatum, Rasmus and Hutchison, Michael 
M. “Effectiveness of Official Daily 
Foreign Exchange Market 
Intervention Operations in Japan.” 
NBER Working Paper 9648, 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2003a. Forthcoming, 
Journal of International Money and 
Finance 





Daily    Other
event 
…we find strong evidence that sterilized intervention systemically affects 
the exchange rate in the short-run (less than one month). This result holds 
even when intervention is not associated with (simultaneous) interest rate 
changes, whether or not intervention is "secret" (in the sense of no official 
reports or rumors of intervention reported over the newswires), and against 
other robustness checks. Large-scale (amounts over $1 billion) intervention, 
coordinated with the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve working in 
unison, give the highest success rate. 
Fatum, Rasmus and Hutchison, Michael 
M. “Is Sterilised Foreign Exchange 
Intervention Effective After All? 
An  event study Approach.” 
Economic Journal, April 2003b, 
113(487), pp. 390-411. 
Germany 






Daily    Other
event 
Focusing on daily Bundesbank and US official intervention operations, we 
identify separate intervention ‘episodes’ and analyse the subsequent effect 
on the exchange rate. Using the non-parametric sign test and matched-
sample test, we find strong evidence that sterilised intervention systemically 
affects the exchange rate in the short run. This result is robust to changes in 
event window definitions over the short run and to controlling for central 
bank interest rate changes during events.  
  36Fatum, Rasmus and Michael R. King, 
Rules versus Discretion in Foreign 
Exchange Intervention: Evidence 
from Official Bank of Canada 
High-Frequency Data, Working 
Paper # 04-24, Santa Cruz Center 
for International Economics, 12 
May 2005.   
 
Canada        January  1995
to September 
1998 
  CAD/USD 5-minute Other
event 
This paper analyzes official, high-frequency Bank of Canada intervention 
and exchange rate data (the latter quoted at the end of every 5-minute 
interval over every 24-hour period) over the January 1995 to September 
1998 time-period. The data is of particular interest as it spans over two 
distinctly different intervention regimes – one characterized by purely rules-
based (“mechanistic”) intervention versus one characterized by both rules-
based and discretionary intervention. This unique feature of the data allows 
for both a comparison of the effects of rules-based version discretionary 
intervention and a general investigation of intraday effects of intervention. 
Employing an event-study methodology and three different criteria for 
success, the study presents strong evidence showing that intervention 
systematically affects movements in the CAD/USD and in the desired 
direction along with some evidence that intervention is associated with a 
reduction of exchange rate volatility. Interestingly, there is no indication 
that discretionary intervention is more effective than rules-based 
intervention. 
Fischer, Andreas M. and Zurlinden, 
Mathias. “Exchange Rate Effects of 
Central Bank Interventions: An 
Analysis of Transaction Prices.” 
The Economic Journal, 1999, 
109(458), pp. 662-76. 






The paper extends results from earlier studies by using the actual prices of 
interventions. Based on the fact that all Swiss National Bank interventions 
are announced, our test exploits the informational differences between 
interventions and customer transactions. A key finding is that only initial 
interventions matter; customer transactions and subsequent interventions 
have no influence. 
Fratzscher, Marcel. “On the Long-Term 
Effectiveness of Exchange Rate 
Communication and Interventions.” 











The paper assesses the strategies and the long-term effectiveness of 
communication as well as actual interventions. The empirical results for the 
G3 economies indicate that communication has not only exhibited a 
significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rates, but also has moved 
forward exchange rates up to a horizon of six months in the desired 
direction. Moreover, communication is found to reduce exchange rate 
volatility and uncertainty whereas actual interventions tend to raise it. 
Overall this underlines a key difference between these two policy tools and 
suggests that communication tends to be a fairly effective policy tool over 
the medium-term. 
Frenkel, Michael; Pierdzioch, Christian 
and Stadtmann, Georg. “The effects 
of Japanese Foreign Exchange 
Market Interventions on the 
Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate 
Volatility.” Kiel Working Paper 
No. 1165, 2003. 
Bank of Japan  1993–2000  USD/JPY  Daily  Time-
series 
event 
…the interventions of the BoJ increased the volatility of the yen/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate. We find that that the interventions of the BoJ, in particular 
those interventions not reported in the financial press, were positively 
correlated with exchange rate volatility. 
  37Galati, Gabriele; Melick, William and 
Micu, Marian. “Foreign exchange 
intervention and expectations: An 
empirical study of the dollar/yen 
exchange rate.” unpublished 
manuscript, Division of 
International Finance, Board of 





USD/JPY    Daily Time-
series 
event 
We estimate probability density functions (PDFs) from option data to 
describe market expectations. We find that, between 1993 and 1996, 
Japanese authorities tended to respond mainly to deviations of the exchange 
rate from some implicit target levels and to a rise in market uncertainty. 
Between 1997 and 2000, the Bank of Japan mainly reacted in response to 
higher uncertainty. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve mainly 
intervened in cooperation with the Bank of Japan. We find that intervention 
had no statistically significant systematic effect on the mean of dollar/yen 
expectations. Consistently, we detect no evidence that intervention 
systematically altered market participants’ bias between a stronger and a 
weaker dollar with respect to the forward rate. Contrary to most findings of 
the literature, we failed to find evidence that intervention was associated on 
average with higher exchange rate variability. Finally, we find that 
intervention was not followed by an increase in the tails of the distribution 
of exchange rate expectations. 
Herrera, Ana Maria and Ozbay, Pinar. “A 
Dynamic Model of Central Bank 
Intervention: Evidence from 
Turkey.” unpublished manuscript,  
Michigan State University, 2005. 










We examine central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets using a 
dynamic censored regression model. We allow the amount of purchase and 
sale interventions to depend nonlinearly upon lagged values of intervention 
and on measures of disorderly foreign exchange markets. Using data for the 
CBRT, we find persistence in interventions, which suggests the presence of 
political costs and/or a signal of future monetary policy. We find strong 
evidence of nonnormality and heteroskedasticity in the Tobit model of 
the reaction function. Estimation results using Powell’s LAD, a robust 
estimator, reveal the importance of considering these specification issues 
when modeling central bank intervention. 
Hillebrand, Eric and Schnabl, Gunther. 
“The Effects of Japanese Foreign 
Exchange Intervention. GARCH 
Estimation and Change Point 
Detection.” unpublished 
manuscript, November 2003. 
Japan    1991-2002  JPY/USD  Daily Time-
series 
event 
Using newly released daily intervention data, we show that the success of 
interventions varies over time. Measured on the total sample between 1991 
and 2002, interventions had the desired effect on the exchange rate at the 
cost of higher volatility. From 1991 to 1998 interventions were unsuccessful 
and coincided with increased exchange rate volatility. Since 1999 
interventions yield the intended effect while volatility is lower. T his 
provides evidence for successful intervention in Japan’s liquidity trap where 
the distinction between sterilized and unsterilized intervention becomes 
blurred.  
Huang, Zhaodan and Neun, Stephen. 
“The Effectiveness of FED 
Intervention in the USD/GM 
Foreign Exchange Market.” 
unpublished manuscript, 2004. 
Germany 
United States 
1978-1995        USD/DEM Daily Other
event 
Tests based on the daily intervention data of the FED and Bundesbank show 
that the FED’s interventions indeed systematically change the course of the 
exchange in the short run, and that the direction of the movement is 
consistent with the central bank’s intention. Further, the paper tests the 
endogeneity problem and argues that it does not jeopardize the conclusions. 
These findings are important to understand why central banks continue to 
use intervention as a policy instrument from time to time. 
Humpage, Owen F. “U.S. Intervention: 
Assessing the Probability of 
Success.” Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 1999, 31(4), 
pp. 731-47. 







Daily    Other
event 
Results from a logit model suggest that coordinated intervention has a 
higher probability of success than unilateral intervention. The probability of 
success also increases with the dollar amount of an intervention. Other 
conditioning variables are not significant. The paper presents a reaction 
function, with adjustments for the incidentally truncated nature of 
intervention data. Predicted values serve as instruments for intervention in 
the logit models. 
  38Humpage, Owen F. “The United States 
as an informed foreign-exchange 
speculator.” Journal of 
International Financial Markets, 
Institutions, and Money, 2000, 
10(3-4), pp. 287-302. 
United States  September 






Daily    Other
event 
US exchange-market interventions have no direct effect on market 
fundamentals, but they may influence expectations. If intervention has value 
as a forecast of exchange-rate movements, knowledge that the United States 
is trading will cause dealers to alter their prior estimates of the distribution 
of exchange-rate changes. This paper finds that US intervention has had 
value only as a forecast that recent exchange-rate movements would 
moderate. Less than half of the interventions, however, seemed successful, 
and the favorable results were generally confined to two short periods that 
were characterized by uncertainty about future Federal Reserve policies.  
Ito, Takatoshi. “Is Foreign Exchange 
Intervention Effective? The 
Japanese Experience in the 1990’s.” 
NBER Working Paper 8914, 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2002. 
Japan  April 1991 – 






The Japanese monetary authorities, by buying the dollar low and selling it 
high, have produced large profits, in terms of realized capital gains, 
unrealized capital gains, and carrying (interest rate differential) profits, from 
interventions during the ten years. Profits amounted to 9 trillion yen (2% of 
GDP) in 10 years. Interventions are found to be effective in the second half 
of the 1990s, when daily yen/dollar exchange rate changes were regressed 
on various factors including interventions. The US interventions in the 
1990s were always accompanied by the Japanese interventions. The joint 
interventions were found to be 20-50 times more effective than the Japanese 
unilateral interventions. Japanese interventions were found to be prompted 
by rapid changes in the yen/dollar rate and the deviation from the long-run 
mean (say, 125 yen). The interventions in the second half were less 
predictable than the first half. 
Kearns, Jonathan and Rigobon, Roberto. 
“Identifying the Efficacy of Central 
Bank Interventions: The Australian 
Case.” Journal of International 







Japan:  May 






Daily  Structural   There are three main results. Our point estimates suggest that central bank 
intervention potentially has an economically and statistically significant 
contemporaneous effect. For Australia we find a $US100m purchase of the 
domestic currency will appreciate the exchange rate by 1.3 to 1.8 per cent. 
This estimate is similar to that from Dominguez and Frankel (1993c), but 
larger than previous empirical findings. Our point estimate for Japan is 
smaller with a $US100m purchase appreciating the yen by just 0.2 per cent, 
but interpretation must consider the substantially larger size of interventions 
conducted by the Bank of Japan. Secondly, the vast majority of the effect of 
an intervention on the exchange rate is found to occur during the day in 
which it is conducted, with only a smaller impact on subsequent days. 
Finally, we confirm that central bank intervention policy can typically be 
characterized as leaning against the wind.  
Kim, Soyoung. “Monetary Policy, 
Foreign Exchange Intervention, and 
the Exchange Rate in a Unifying 
Framework.” Journal of 
International Economics, 2003, 
60(2), pp. 355-86. 
United States  1974 – 1996   Trade-
weighted 
monthly 
Monthly    Structural
VAR 
The structural VAR model is developed to jointly analyze the effects of 
foreign exchange intervention and (money or interest rate setting) 
conventional monetary policy on the exchange rate, the two types of policy 
reactions to the exchange rate, and interactions between the two types of 
policies. First, many interactions among the two types of policies and the 
exchange rate are found, which suggests that a joint analysis is important. 
Second, foreign exchange intervention has substantial effects on the 
exchange rate, reacts to the exchange rate significantly (to stabilize the 
exchange rate), and signals future conventional monetary policy stance 
changes (to back up the intervention).  
  39Kim, Suk-Joong: Kortian, Tro and Sheen, 
Jeffrey. “Central Bank Intervention 
and Exchange Rate Volatility – 
Australian Evidence Journal of 
International Financial Markets 
Institutions and Money, 2000, 10(3-
4), pp. 381-405. 
Australia        1983-1997 AUD/USD  Daily Time-
series 
event 
We find contemporaneous positive correlation between the direction of 
intervention and the conditional mean and variance of the exchange rate 
returns. We show that sustained and large interventions have a stabilising 
influence in the foreign exchange market in terms of direction and 
volatility. Without these interventions, the market would have moved 
further and exhibited more volatility. 
Morel, Christophe and Teiletche, Jerome. 
“Do Interventions in Foreign 
Exchange Markets Modify 
Investors’ Expectations? The 
Experience of Japan Between 1992 
and 2003.” Working Paper 2005-
04, University of Paris Dauphine, 
January 2005. 
Japan  April 1992 – 
October 
2003 
JPY/USD    Daily Time-
series 
event 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the Bank of Japan’s 
official interventions on the JPY/USD parity during the period 1992-2003. 
The novelty of our approach is to combine two recent advances of the 
empirical literature on foreign exchange interventions: (i) drawing on over 
the-counter option prices to characterize more precisely the distribution of 
market expectations; (ii) redefining interventions in terms of events as they 
tend to come in clusters. Moreover, in order to deal with the features of the 
data (small sample size, non-standard distribution), we use bootstrap tests. 
Neely, Christopher J. “Identifying the 
Effects of Central Bank 
Intervention.” Working Paper 2005-
031A, Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, 2005b. 
United States  1987-1990  DEM/USD 
JPY/USD 
Twice-daily    Structural
VAR and  
structural 
nonlinear 
Most intervention studies have been silent on the assumed structure of the 
economic system—implicitly imposing implausible assumptions—despite 
the fact that inference depends crucially on such issues.  This paper 
proposes to identify the cross-effects of intervention with the level and 
volatility of exchange rates using the likely timing of intervention, 
macroeconomic announcements as instruments and the nonlinear structure 
of the intervention reaction function.  Proper identification of the effects of 
intervention indicates that it is moderately effective in changing the levels 
of exchange rates but has no significant effect on volatility.  The paper also 
illustrates that such inference depends on paying careful attention to 
seemingly innocuous identification assumptions. 
Pasquariello, Paolo. “Informative 
Trading or Just Noise?  An 
Analysis of Currency Returns, 
Market Liquidity, and Transactions 
Costs in Proximity of Central Bank 
Interventions.” unpublished 
manuscript, New York University, 
November 3, 2002. 





We find that the effectiveness of these trades is crucially related to their 
perceived information content, rather than to imperfect substitutability or 
inventory considerations. Indeed, regardless of their size, only SNB 
interventions (especially when unexpected or inconsistent with market 
momentum) had significant and persistent effects on daily CHF/USD 
returns, although they often failed to smooth currency fluctuations. 
Unsuccessful transactions instead induced the greatest misinformation and 
heterogeneity of beliefs among market participants and reduced market 
liquidity. These changes always translated into higher, economically 
significant transaction costs borne by the population of investors. 
Payne, Richard and Vitale, Paolo. “A 
Transaction Level Study of the 
Effects of Central Bank 
Intervention on Exchange Rates.” 
Journal of International 
Economics, 2003, 61(2), pp. 331-
52. 
Switzerland  1986 – 1995  CHF/USD 
 
15-minute    Other
event 
Using an event study approach we find that intervention has important 
short-run effects on exchange rate returns. In particular, among various 
results, we find that i) intervention has a stronger impact when the SNB 
moves with-the-market and when its activity is concerted with that of other 
central banks and ii) exchange rate returns move in the 15 min interval prior 
to interventions.  
Pierdzioch, Christian and Stadtmann, 
Georg. “The Effectiveness of the 
Interventions of the Swiss National 
Bank — An Event-Study 
Analysis.” Swiss Journal of 
Economics and Statistics, 2004, 
140(2), pp. 229-44. 
Switzerland  1986 – 1995  CHF/USD  Daily  Other 
event 
We find some evidence that the interventions of the SNB had an impact on 
exchange rate dynamics. The significance of this effect, however, depends 
on the direction of intervention. In general, the evidence suggests that the 
interventions of the SNB to strengthen the Swiss franc were more effective 
than its interventions to weaken the Swiss franc. We also find that the 
results of the tests for the effectiveness of the interventions of the SNB 
depend upon the length of the pre- and post-event window analyzed.  
  40Ramaswamy, Ramana and Samiei, 
Hossein. “The Yen-Dollar Rate: 
Have Interventions Mattered?” 
Working Paper No. 00-95, 







Bank of Japan  
and U.S. 
intervention. 





Using daily data for 1995-99, this paper estimates a simple forward looking 
model of the exchange rate to show that foreign exchange interventions 
have, on the whole, had small but persistent effects on the yen-dollar rate. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, sterilized interventions have mattered. 
Consistent with conventional wisdom, coordinated interventions have a 
higher probability of success and move the yen-dollar rate by a larger 
margin than unilateral interventions. A probit model indicates that both an 
excessive appreciation and depreciation of the yen provoke interventions, 
and that interventions occur in clusters—if there is one today, there will 
likely be another tomorrow.  
Reitz, Stefan, Nonlinear Impact of 
Central Bank Intervention on 
Exchange Rates?, Unpublished 











In this paper we study a relatively new route of effectiveness of central bank 
intervention as proposed by Sarno and Taylor (2001). According to their 
argumentation strong and persistent misalignments of the exchange rate are 
due to a weakening of stabilizing speculation. Of course, the more the 
exchange rate deviates from purchasing power parity (ppp) the larger the 
cumulative losses associated with speculation based on ppp so that 
stabilizing speculators tend to leave the market. In such circumstances, 
intervention operations of central banks may encourage their re-entry into 
the market. Applying daily Federal Reserve intervention data from 1980 to 
1992 we find that the dollar mark exchange rate’s reversion to ppp depends 
nonlinearly on the amount of intervention operations and the degree of 
misalignment. The empirical results suggest that the FED’s interventions 
have been effective by increasing speculators’ confidence in the validity of 
ppp. 
Rogers, Jeff M. and Siklos, Pierre L. 
“Foreign Exchange Market 
Intervention in Two Small Open 
Economies: the Canadian and 
Australian Experience.” Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 
2003, 22(3), pp. 393-416. 
Canada 
Australia 






Both central banks intervene in response to excessive exchange rate 
volatility and uncertainty. Volatility is the implied volatility of foreign 
currency futures options. Uncertainty is the kurtosis of the implied risk-
neutral probability density functions. We also examine the impact of 
inflation targets. Unlike other studies we also consider commodity futures 
prices. These turn out to help explain the effectiveness of intervention. 
Central bank intervention was largely unsuccessful in both countries though 
volatility and kurtosis were modestly affected.  
Smith, Michael; McLennan, Michael and 
Sheen, Jeffrey. “Joint Estimation of 
an Endogenous Model of Central 
Bank Intervention and Foreign 
Exchange Volatility with 
Application to Australia, 1983 to 
2003.” Working Paper ECMT2004-
3, University of Sydney School of 
Economics and Political Science, 
July 2004. 
Australia      1983-2003 AUD/USD  Daily Time-
series 
event 
A stochastic volatility model with jumps is employed for the exchange rate, 
while a threshold model is used for intervention. The jump and latent 
volatility processes in the stochastic volatility model and latent intervention 
in the threshold model, are endogenous. To account for this, both models 
are estimated jointly using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). The model 
is applied to the analysis of intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) in the Australian/US dollar exchange rate from 1983 to 2003. …The 
empirical work suggests that RBA intervention is partially precipitated by 
volatility in the foreign exchange rate. However, RBA intervention appears 
to have exacerbated contemporaneous volatility between 1983 and 1993, 
but has since avoided having any effect. Analysis of lagged volatility 
suggests one reason may be improved targeting of intervention to address 
contemporaneous volatility, as opposed to volatility occurring on previous 
trading days. The RBA does not appear to respond to jumps identified in the 
exchange rate.  
  41Taylor, Mark P. "Is Official Exchange 
Rate Intervention Effective?" 












I examine the effectiveness of exchange rate intervention within the context 
of a Markov-switching model for the real exchange rate. The probability of 
switching between stable and unstable regimes depends non-linearly upon 
the amount of intervention, the degree of misalignment and the duration of 
the regime. Applying this to dollar-mark data for the period 1985-98, I find 
that intervention increases the probability of stability when the rate is 
misaligned, and that its influence grows with the degree of misalignment. 
Intervention within a small neighbourhood of equilibrium will result in a 
greater probability of instability.  
 
  42